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 NOTES 
Be Careful What You Do Not Ask For 
Contracts with the federal government 
for which purely nonmonetary relief 
exists in the event of breach must 
provide for monetary damages to 
make them available to non-breaching 
private parties 
Higbie v. United States, 778 F.3d 990 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
MATTHEW W. CECIL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
By further limiting access to one of the only forums in which private parties 
may seek monetary damages over $10,000 from the federal government, the Unit-
ed States Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Higbie v. United States1 has ensured 
non-breaching private parties will not be wholly compensated for their injuries 
and has undermined the court’s own interest in bolstering mediation. 
Outside limited exceptions, parties may only sue the United States govern-
ment for monetary damages over $10,000 in the United States Court of Federal 
Claims,2 and even then only for claims in which the federal government has ex-
plicitly waived its sovereign immunity.  The Tucker Act, which grants Federal 
Court of Claims’ subject matter jurisdiction, requires claims to be based on a dis-
tinct and substantive money-mandating source of law.  In Higbie v. United States, 
the United States Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that Higbie, a former fed-
eral government employee, was not entitled to monetary damages for the govern-
ment’s breach of a confidentiality provision in a mediation agreement signed with 
Higbie as the contract did not explicitly contemplate the availability of monetary 
damages.  As a result, the federal circuit court found that the Court of Federal 
Claims had properly dismissed Higbie’s breach of contract claim for lack of sub-
                                                          
     * B.A., DePauw University, 2012; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2016. I 
would like to thank the staff of the Journal of Dispute Resolution, who edited this Note, for the signifi-
cant time and effort they dedicated throughout the entire process. 
 1. Higbie v. United States, 778 F.3d 990, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 
5579 (2015). 
 2. Federal district courts share concurrent jurisdiction with the United States Court of Federal 
Claims over claims not exceeding $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2013). 
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ject matter jurisdiction.  In a case of first impression, the federal circuit court 
guaranteed that the federal government would not be held liable for damages from 
breaching a mediation agreement’s confidentiality provision.  Contrary to the 
government’s own interest, the ruling also undermined the effectiveness of media-
tion as a cost-conscious alternative to litigation. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
Richard Higbie, a Senior Criminal Investigator in Dallas, Texas, for the Bu-
reau of Diplomatic Security of the United States State Department, contacted the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on January 15, 2009, alleg-
ing that the State Department had discriminated and retaliated against him for 
actions protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3  The complaint was referred to 
mediation, and the parties signed an agreement, the “EEO/Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Agreement to Mediate” (Mediation Agreement),4 which included the 
following confidentiality provision: “Mediation is a confidential process. Any 
documents submitted to the mediator(s) and statements made during the mediation 
are for settlement purposes only.”5  Higbie testified at an evidentiary hearing that 
he purposefully negotiated for confidentiality prior to the mediation.6  He ex-
plained that he did not want his supervisors to use anything that occurred during 
the mediation against him in his employment.7  Mediation between Higbie and the 
State Department proved unsuccessful, and the EEOC resumed its investigation.8  
Two of Higbie’s supervisors, Marian Cotter and Jeffrey Thomas, provided affida-
vits during the EEOC investigation that described Higbie’s statements during the 
mediation and suggested he was uncooperative.9 
Higbie filed suit against the United States on October 5, 2011, in federal dis-
trict court for the Northern District of Texas.10  His complaint sought monetary 
damages and alleged, among other claims, that the State Department had breached 
the confidentiality provision of the Mediation Agreement based on the disclosure 
of the information contained in Cotter and Thomas’ affidavits.11  Higbie ultimate-
ly brought a claim for breach of contract under Texas common law.12  On April 
17, 2013, following a transfer motion by Higbie, the breach of contract claim was 
moved to the United States Court of Federal Claims,13 where Higbie could seek 
                                                          
 3. Higbie v. United States, 778 F.3d at 991; Higbie v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 358, 360 (2013). 
 4. Higbie, 113 Fed. Cl. at 361. 
 5. Higbie, 778 F.3d at 992 (emphasis in original). 
 6. Id. at 991-92. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 992. 
 9. Id. at 992, 998 (Taranto, J., dissenting) (indicating that the affidavits alleged Higbie stonewalled 
mediation). 
 10. Higbie v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 358, 361 (2013) 
 11. Higbie v. United States, 778 F.3d at 992. Higbie alleged that the affidavits “demonstrated a 
willful attempt by [Cotter and Thomas] to further discriminate and retaliate against the Plaintiff for 
engaging in related protected activity.” Higbie, 113 Fed. Cl. at 361. 
 12. Higbie, 113 Fed. Cl. at 361. 
 13. Congress created the United States Court of Federal Claims in 1855, which was then labeled the 
Court of Claims. The People’s Court, UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS 
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/court_info/Court_History_Brochure.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2015).  Among other duties, the Article I court provides a venue for citizens seeking mone-
2
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monetary damages.14  On September 13, 2013, the court dismissed Higbie’s claim 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, on the basis that the Mediation Agreement 
could not “fairly be interpreted as contemplating money damages in the event of 
breach.”15  The court explained that Higbie had failed to respond to the govern-
ment’s argument that the Mediation Agreement did not contemplate the award of 
money damages in the case of breach.16  Higbie subsequently appealed the dismis-
sal of his complaint to the United States Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.17 
The Federal Circuit Court affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.18  The appellate court wrote that where a purely 
non-monetary form of relief exists for breach of contract, a plaintiff must show 
that the agreement in question could be fairly interpreted to contemplate monetary 
damages for the Court of Federal Claims to have jurisdiction under the Tucker 
Act.19 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Traditionally, monetary damages are implied for breach of contract absent 
contrary language.20  However, in breach of contract claims before the Court of 
Federal Claims, plaintiffs may be required to show that the agreement in question 
contemplated monetary damages when a purely non-monetary form of relief ex-
ists.21 
A. Federal Jurisdiction over Breach of Contract Claims against the United 
States Government 
The Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdictional authority is limited to claims 
against the United States government.22  The federal government has sovereign 
immunity and therefore cannot be sued unless it has waived immunity or explicit-
ly consented to suit.23  The Tucker Act encapsulates such an area where the feder-
al government has waived sovereign immunity and conferred jurisdiction on the 
Court of Federal Claims for “any claim against the United States founded . . . 
                                                          
tary damages against the United States government.  Id.  The court’s general jurisdiction is set out in 
28 U.S.C. § 1491.  Id. 
 14. Higbie, 113 Fed. Cl. at 361. 
 15. Id. at 365. 
 16. Id.  In support of his argument, Higbie cited to a Florida statute that provided a cause of action 
for breach of mediation confidentiality and contemplated monetary relief.  Id.  Higbie also cited to two 
trade secret cases as well as to a California Supreme Court case addressing the availability of monetary 
relief for violation of court-ordered mediation.  Id.  The Court of Federal Claims found none of these 
sources persuasive.  Id. 
 17. Id.; Higbie v. United States, 778 F.3d 990, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 18. Higbie, 778 F.3d at 991. 
 19. Id. at 992-93.  The Tucker Act is a jurisdictional provision that carves out exceptions to the 
United States’ sovereign immunity based on other sources of law.  United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 
U.S. 287, 290 (2009).  The Act requires plaintiffs to base their claims on a separate source of substan-
tive law, which must “fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government.”  
Id. (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)). 
 20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Every breach of 
contract gives the injured party a right to damages against the party in breach”). 
 21. Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 22. Simmons v. New York, 50 Fed. App’x. 988, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 23. United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 289 (2009). 
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upon any express or implied contract with the United States.”24  Before the Court 
of Federal Claims can exercise jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, “a plaintiff must 
identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money dam-
ages.”25  The claims court cannot grant equitable relief unrelated to a claim for 
monetary damages.26 
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals observed in Holmes v. United States 
that previous courts, including the United States Supreme Court,27 have not re-
quired the monetary relief inquiry in granting Tucker Act jurisdiction for contract-
based claims.28  Typically, federal courts have treated contract-based claims dif-
ferently in assessing Tucker Act jurisdiction, skirting the question of whether the 
agreement contemplated monetary relief.29  Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit 
Court in Holmes held that the monetary relief inquiry could be required in breach 
of contract claims where the agreement provided for purely nonmonetary relief.30  
The monetary relief inquiry has also been required for contracts entirely con-
cerned with the conduct of parties in a criminal case,31 or where the agreement 
expressly disavowed monetary damages.32 
The Federal Circuit Court has stressed that not all contracts with the United 
States government grant Tucker Act jurisdiction.33  In Rick’s Mushroom Service, 
Inc. v. United States, the circuit court held that the Court of Federal Claims had 
properly found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit, which 
sought indemnification from the government in connection with a cost-share 
agreement the parties had entered.34 
According to the circuit court, the claims court lacked jurisdiction because 
Rick’s Mushroom Service’s breach of contract claim was not based on a money-
mandating source of law.35  Unlike Higbie’s Texas-contract-law-based claim, 
Rick’s Mushroom Service’s breach of contract claim was not brought under state 
contract law, but the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, a federal law.36  Rick’s 
Mushroom Service’s claim failed because the Contract Disputes Act only applies 
to express or implied government contracts for procurement of goods or ser-
vices.37  The cost-share agreement between Rick’s Mushroom Service’s and the 
federal government was not such a contract.38 
Still, Tucker Act breach of contract claims based on state law must be judged 
by federal law: “It is well settled that contracts to which the government is a party 
. . . are normally governed by federal law, not by the law of the state where they 
are made or performed.”39 
                                                          
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2011). 
 25. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 26. Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n v. United States, 160 F.3d 714, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 27. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976). 
 28. Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 1314-15. 
 31. Sanders v. United States, 252 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 32. Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1314. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 35. Id. at 1343-44. 
 36. Id. at 1342. 
 37. Id. at 1343-44; 41 U.S.C. § 602(a). 
 38. Rick’s Mushroom Service, 521 F.3d at 1344. 
 39. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1295, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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B. Contemplating Monetary Damages in Mediation Agreements 
Federal courts have rarely addressed the breach of confidentiality provisions 
in mediation agreements.  However, in applying state contract law, federal courts 
have awarded monetary damages for breach of such confidentiality clauses.  In 
Bethlehem Area School District v. Zhou, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that a school district had breached the confi-
dentiality provision of a mediation agreement with Diana Zhou, a mother of two 
students in the school district.40  The school district entered into the agreement to 
mediate with Zhou to address allegations that she had taken advantage of a right to 
certain due process procedures provided under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Act.41  After mediation proved ineffective, the school district filed suit against 
Zhou and wrote in its complaint that Zhou had told the mediator she was using the 
due process procedures to drive up legal costs for the school district in hopes that 
it would pay for her children to attend private school.42  Zhou counterclaimed for 
breach of contract based on the comments provided in the school district’s com-
plaint and requested monetary relief.43  The district court held that Zhou was enti-
tled to damages as in any other breach of contract claim and awarded her nominal 
damages of $1, adding that Zhou could introduce evidence of actual damages at 
trial.44  The court also enjoined the school district from calling the mediator to 
testify at trial and found that evidence of statements made during mediation could 
not be admitted at trial.45 
Similarly, the United States District Court of Kansas held in Bashaw v. John-
son that defendant Jeremiah Johnson, an attorney, would be entitled to damages 
for breach of contract if he proved that plaintiffs had violated the confidentiality 
agreement the parties signed before mediation.46  Plaintiffs, who were former 
employees of Johnson’s, agreed to participate in a confidential mediation session 
with Johnson in connection with their allegations that Johnson had used an appli-
cation on his smartphone and personal tablet to film under the employees’ cloth-
ing.47  After mediation failed, Johnson claimed that the employees brought infor-
mation obtained during mediation to the county prosecutor who had been consid-
ering whether to file criminal charges against Johnson for the conduct outlined in 
plaintiffs’ lawsuit.48  The court cast doubt on Johnson’s assertion that the breach 
increased his risk for criminal prosecution but indicated that Johnson was never-
theless entitled to damages if he could prove actual harm.49 
Additionally, in Sarsfield v. County of San Benito, the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California declined to award relief for alleged 
breach of a mediation agreement’s confidentiality clause but considered monetary 
                                                          
 40. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. v. Zhou, No. 09–03493, 2012 WL 930998, at *1 (E.D. Pa. March 20, 
2012). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at *4-5. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Bashaw v. Johnson, No. 11–2693–JWL, 2012 WL 1623483, at *3–4 (D. Kan. May 9, 2012). 
 47. Id. at *1, *3. 
 48. Id. at *3. 
 49. Id. at *4-5. 
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damages to be the proper potential remedy.50  Plaintiff Sarsfield had entered into a 
confidential mediation contract to discuss potential settlement agreements arising 
out of sexual harassment claims against him.51  The district court found that plain-
tiff’s claim that the prosecutor’s office where he used to work breached the confi-
dentiality clause of the mediation agreement was unsubstantiated and that plaintiff 
had failed to prove legally cognizable damages entitling him to monetary relief.52  
Other federal courts have found monetary relief proper for the breach of contrac-
tual confidentiality provisions in a variety of other contexts as well.53 
C. Presumption of Monetary Relief for Breach of Contract 
Monetary damages are the presumptive relief for breach of contract.  The Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts generally provides that any party injured by 
breach of contract is entitled to monetary damages.54  Contracts also normally “do 
not contain provisions specifying the basis for the award of damages in case of 
breach.”55  Texas contract law, the substantive law on which Higbie based his 
complaint in the Court of Federal Claims, provides that monetary damages are the 
preferred remedy for breach of contract.56  Monetary damages are also the default 
remedy for breach of a contract with the United States government.57  In addition, 
courts usually refrain from awarding equitable relief where monetary damages 
suffice to compensate the injured party.58 
The United States Supreme Court has held that in interpreting contracts, 
courts should look to background legal rules, or default rules, absent contrary 
language in the agreement.59  Judge Posner, too, has written that contracts “are 
enacted against a background of common-sense understandings and legal princi-
ples that the parties may not have bothered to incorporate expressly but that oper-
ate as default rules to govern in the absence of a clear expression of the parties’ 
intent that they not govern.”60 
As previously discussed, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has held that 
presumption of monetary damages for a breach of contract generally satisfies the 
                                                          
 50. Sarsfield v. City of San Benito, No. 07–cv–02528 JF, 2010 WL 1929619, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 
12, 2010). 
 51. Id. at *1. 
 52. Id. at *10. 
 53. See, e.g., Youtie v. Macy’s Retail Holding, Inc., 626 F.Supp.2d 511 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (employ-
ment contract); Davidson v. Cao, 211 F.Supp. 2d 264 (D. Mass. 2002) (confidential disclosure agree-
ment concerning drug research). 
 54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981)  (“Every breach 
of contract gives the injured party a right to damages against the party in breach”). 
 55. San Juan City College v. United States, 391 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 56. Zachary Const. Corp. v. Port of Houston Authority of Harris County, 449 S.W.3d 98, 112 n. 66 
(Tex. 2014) (“[P]arties entering into a contract presumably contemplate that contract damages will be 
available if that contract is breached.”). 
 57. Sanders v. United States, 252 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001); United States v. Winstar Corp., 
518 U.S. 839, 885 (1996). 
 58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Specific perfor-
mance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the expectation 
interest of the injured party.”). 
 59. US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1549 (2013) (“Indeed, ignoring those rules is 
likely to frustrate the parties’ intent and produce perverse consequences.”). 
 60. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 
2000). 
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Tucker Act’s monetary relief requirement.61  Such an inquiry is only required 
when the agreement is entirely concerned with the conduct of parties in a criminal 
case,62 expressly disavows monetary damages,63 or provides for purely nonmone-
tary relief.64 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
The United States Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Higbie agreed by a 2-1 
majority that the availability of purely nonmonetary relief obviated the monetary 
relief inquiry.65  On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the lower court’s dismis-
sal de novo.66  In affirming the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, a divided Federal Circuit Court of Appeals substantial-
ly mirrored the lower court’s reasoning.67 
A. Majority Opinion 
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that while the presumption that monetary 
damages are available for a breach of contract usually obviated the Tucker Act’s 
monetary relief requirement, certain exceptions existed.68  In particular, the court 
pointed to instances in which the contract’s terms expressly waived monetary 
damages or in which the relief for breach could be entirely nonmonetary.69  Where 
a purely nonmonetary form of relief exists, the court may require complainant to 
show the agreement in question contemplated monetary damages for the Court of 
Federal Claims to exercise jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.70 
As an initial matter, the court held that because the Mediation Agreement 
provided for a purely nonmonetary remedy — the exclusion of statements made 
during mediation for any purposes other than settlement — it was proper for the 
Court of Federal Claims to require the monetary relief inquiry.71  The majority 
added that this interpretation followed the logic of Rule 408 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence,72 which provides that “a statement made during compromise negotia-
tions about the claim . . . to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed 
claim” is inadmissible.73 
Higbie contended that the Mediation Agreement could be fairly read as con-
templating monetary damages and, in fact, that all such agreements contemplate 
monetary damages for breach of confidentiality agreements.74  In support, Higbie 
                                                          
 61. Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011)  (“[W]hen a breach of contract 
claim is brought in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, the plaintiff comes armed with 
the presumption that money damages are available, so that normally no further inquiry is required.”). 
 62. Sanders, 252 F.3d at 1336. 
 63. Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1314. 
 64. Id. at 1314-15. 
 65. Higbie v. United States, 778 F.3d 990, 991-93 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 66. Id. at 993. 
 67. Id. at 993-95. 
 68. Id. at 993. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Higbie, 778 F.3d at 994. 
 72. Id. 
 73. FED. R. EVID. 408. 
 74. Higbie, 778 F.3d at 993-95. 
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pointed to sources stressing the importance of confidentiality in mediation and the 
benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).75  Specifically, Higbie refer-
enced Congressional findings describing the benefits of ADR and portions of the 
EEOC’s website discussing the importance of confidentiality in mediation.76  He 
also alleged that monetary relief was implied from the terms of the contract and 
discussions between the parties.77  However, he did not identify any contractual 
provisions or statements supporting that contention.78 
The court largely avoided discussing the merits of Higbie’s other offers of le-
gal authority beyond decrying them as non-controlling state law.79 
B. Dissenting Opinion 
Writing separately in dissent, Judge Taranto argued that the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals should honor the strong general rule that monetary damages are 
implied for breaches of contract and that the Court of Federal Claims accordingly 
had jurisdiction over Higbie’s complaint.80  Judge Taranto cited as authority a 
number of cases discussed earlier in this Note that provided for monetary damages 
as a remedy for breach of confidentiality provisions in mediation agreements.81  
The judge disagreed with the majority that the text of the Mediation Agreement 
implied that monetary damages were not contemplated in the event of breach.82  
He suggested that the kind of equitable remedy present in this case, exclusion of 
evidence, supplemented rather than replaced monetary relief.83 
In conclusion, Judge Taranto stressed that the matter before the court was on-
ly a threshold jurisdictional issue.84  Regardless of any perceived lack of merit in 
Higbie’s claim, the judge wrote that he believed the complainant’s pleading had 
cleared the Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdictional hurdle.85 
V. COMMENT 
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has stressed that the government has 
not consented to suit for every contract into which it enters.86  Among other in-
stances, the court has said that where a purely non-monetary form of relief exists, 
a court may require the complainant to show that the parties contemplated mone-
tary relief when entering the agreement at issue.87  The Federal Circuit has main-
                                                          
 75. Id. at 993-94. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 993-95. 
 78. Id. at 995. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Higbie, 778 F.3d at 995 (Taranto, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 996 
 82. Id. at 997 (“[T]here is no such express disavowal in the agreement at issue here. Nor is there a 
sound basis for finding an implicit disavowal.”). 
 83. Id. at 996-97. 
 84. Id. at 1000. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 87. Id. at 1314-15. 
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tained this position while acknowledging the longstanding presumption of mone-
tary relief for breach of contract.88 
The appellate court’s ruling in Higbie guaranteed that where the United States 
government breaches a confidentiality provision in a mediation agreement, some 
victims will not be fully compensated or even compensated at all for their injuries.  
Furthermore, the court’s decision ran contrary to its own interests in undermining 
the effectiveness of mediation as a cost-conscious alternative to litigation. 
A. The Higbie Ruling Sets a Precedent of Inadequate Compensation for the 
Federal Government’s Breach of Confidentiality Provisions in Mediation 
Agreements 
The availability of monetary relief for breach of contract ensures that non-
breaching parties are being placed in as good a position as they would have been 
had the breaching party fully performed.89  With the breach of confidentiality 
clauses, evidentiary exclusion alone often fails to fully compensate the non-
breaching party for its injuries.90  In his dissent, Judge Taranto pointed to potential 
reputational or job-related harms resulting from breach of confidentiality.91  The 
non-breaching party would likely face increased legal costs to resolve the dispute 
as well.92 
The evidentiary remedy in cases like Higbie’s remains vital to curing harm 
done by breach of confidentiality.  Yet the inclusion of language in a mediation 
agreement providing for such an equitable remedy by no means indicates an inten-
tion to preclude the availability of monetary damages.93  Equitable relief is gener-
ally unavailable where monetary damages adequately compensate a victim of 
contractual breach.94  Accordingly, Judge Taranto stressed that it made “perfect 
sense for a contract to provide expressly for a non-monetary remedy to ensure its 
availability,” and that such a provision did not imply that the non-monetary reme-
dy would be exclusive.95 
Furthermore, it is illogical to presume Higbie would have expected his only 
remedy to be the exclusion of statements made during mediation from future legal 
proceedings.  As the court and federal government identify,96  Federal Rules of 
Evidence 408 already secures that right.97  Higbie may have wanted to be redun-
                                                          
 88. Sanders v. United States, 252 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 89. N. Star Alaska Hous. Corp. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 158, 212 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 90. Higbie, 778 F.3d at 997-98 (Taranto, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 998 (“[F]or example, Mr. Higbie might incur delay and expense from additional proceed-
ings in the resolution of his discrimination claim because the EEO investigator, at an early stage, might 
have been influenced by knowledge of Mr. Higbie’s alleged stonewalling in the mediation.”). 
 93. Id. at 997 (“The natural inference is that this kind of specified remedy supplements but does not 
supplant the default damages remedy.”). 
 94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Specific perfor-
mance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the expectation 
interest of the injured party.”). 
 95. Higbie, 778 F.3d at 997 (Taranto, J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. at 994. 
 97. FED. R. EVID. 408 (“Evidence of the following is not admissible — on behalf of any party — 
either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior incon-
sistent statement or a contradiction: … conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations 
about the claim.”). 
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dant in ensuring that statements made during mediation were not later used against 
him.  However, Higbie also wanted protections beyond those encapsulated in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  He wanted to ensure not only that the statements 
made during mediation were kept out of other legal proceedings, but that those 
confidential statements were not disclosed in any manner or at any time as well.98 
For this reason, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals’ monetary relief re-
quirement fails on policy grounds.  It presupposes individuals entering into con-
tracts with the federal government have any awareness of sovereign immunity or 
the difference between equitable and monetary relief.  In reality, these private 
parties likely expect greater protection than the specter of equitable remedies af-
ford.  Higbie and others may not have considered the possibility of monetary 
damages until breach.  However, that does not indicate that they did not expect to 
be fully compensated — regardless of the means of relief — for whatever injury 
they did incur as a result of breach.  Furthermore, Higbie would naturally assume 
that the agreement did not need to explicitly contemplate monetary relief if he was 
familiar with contract law, as monetary damages are the presumptive remedy for 
breach of contract.  Ignorance of the law is no excuse,99 but the law should also 
not rely on illogical presumptions and contradictions. 
The unavailability of monetary damages where an agreement provides for 
purely nonmonetary relief makes sense when the nonmonetary remedy fully com-
pensates the injured party.  However, for claims where the government has waived 
sovereign immunity, where nonmonetary relief does not suffice, and where mone-
tary relief is presumed in nearly all other contexts, a monetary remedy should be 
available.  In Higbie, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals ensured that 
some private parties will not be fully compensated should the federal government 
breach confidentiality provisions in mediation agreements between the two.  The 
Federal Circuit Court’s ruling also undermines the federal government’s own 
interests in promoting mediation as a cost-effective alternative to litigation. 
B. Allowing Monetary Damages for Breach of Confidentiality Provisions 
in Mediation Agreements with the United States Government Benefits the 
Federal Court System 
Sovereign immunity, and otherwise limiting subject matter jurisdiction, pro-
vides the Court of Federal Claims, and federal courts in general, with some relief 
from docket congestion.  Mediation and other forms of ADR further alleviate 
caseloads.100  However, the effectiveness of mediation stems in large part from the 
reliability of confidentiality guarantees as legal mechanisms to discourage unau-
thorized disclosure.101  In precluding monetary relief when not explicitly contem-
plated by the parties for breach of confidentiality provisions in mediation agree-
ments with the federal government, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Higbie 
undermined that which makes mediation so effective. 
                                                          
 98. Higbie, 778 F.3d at 991-92. 
 99. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 574 (2010). 
 100. 1 Alt. Disp. Resol. § 22:1, n. 1 (3d ed.) (citing various sources describing efficiency of alterna-
tive dispute resolution methods in alleviating court congestion). 
 101. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation: A Promise Unfulfilled?, 54 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1419, 1419 n. 1 (2006). 
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Confidentiality provides an integral foundation for mediation102 and “pro-
motes the free flow of information that may result in the settlement of a dis-
pute.”103  The success of mediation depends largely on the preservation of party 
confidences.104  Confidentiality facilitates candor between parties and ensures 
attorneys do not use mediation as a discovery tool.105 
Private parties that know they will likely not be entitled to monetary damages 
in the event of the government’s breach will be less amenable to mediation.  
While government employees like Higbie may bargain for a clause in the media-
tion agreement calling for monetary damages in the case of breach, the employ-
ees’ comparatively weak bargaining position may not always allow for such a 
clause.  Monetary damages are also often presumed, absent contrary contractual 
language.106  Government agents, like the government employees who provided 
affidavits discussing Higbie’s actions during mediation, will be less deterred from 
breaching confidentiality agreements knowing that, in many cases, the only reme-
dy available to the complainant will be the exclusion of confidential evidence 
from later legal proceedings.  Where monetary damages have not been specifically 
contemplated, little prevents the government from causing significant reputational 
harm to complainants like Higbie. 
The money saved in shrinking federal dockets could outweigh the added costs 
of paying out monetary damages.  Breach of confidentiality provisions in media-
tion agreements mark a narrow area for liability.  The cases would surely be rare 
where a complainant could prove that the government breached a confidentiality 
provision in a mediation agreement and that the breach caused injury to the com-
plainant sufficient to warrant monetary relief.  The availability of monetary dam-
ages does not necessitate entitlement.107  While the exact cost savings of bolster-
ing mediation as an alternative to litigation are unknown, it is reasonable to be-
lieve those fiscal benefits would reach farther than the government’s potential 
increase in exposure to monetary liability for breach of mediation agreements’ 
confidentiality provisions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States Court of Federal Claims remains one of the only forums in 
which parties like Higbie may seek monetary relief from the federal government.  
By limiting access to that court based on the parties’ explicit contemplation of 
monetary damages, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has curtailed non-
breaching parties’ compensation for injury and undermined the court’s own inter-
est in bolstering mediation. 
                                                          
 102. In re Teligent, Inc., 640 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Confidentiality is an important feature of 
the mediation and other alternative dispute resolution processes.”). 
 103. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Dec. 17, 1996, 148 F.3d 487, 492 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 104. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627, 636 (4th Cir. 2002); In re County of Los Angeles, 
223 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Poly Software Int’l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. 
Utah 1995)); Clark v. Stapleton, 957 F.2d 745, 746 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 105. In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d at 636. 
 106. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59. 
 107. Higbie v. United States, 778 F.3d 990, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Taranto, J., dissenting) (citing 
Sarsfield v. County of San Benito, No. 07–cv–02528 JF, 2010 WL 1929619, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. 
2010)). 
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Contrary to the common law rule that monetary damages are the default rem-
edy for breach of contract, private parties entering into a contract with the federal 
government must now bargain for an explicit statement of the availability of mon-
etary damages in case of breach.  Given the federal government’s comparatively 
strong bargaining position, private parties may be less willing to seek redress for 
discrimination and retaliation because monetary damages may offer the only com-
prehensive means of compensation and because they know they will have to bar-
gain for that monetary relief.  The Higbie ruling has given the federal government 
little disincentive to breach agreements that provide for a purely nonmonetary 
form of relief and that do not contemplate monetary damages.  The Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals has curtailed non-breaching parties’ access to monetary relief in 
one of the only courts where such relief is available. 
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